We investigate whether hospitals in the English National Health Service change their quality or efficiency in response to changes in quality or efficiency of neighbouring hospitals. We first provide a theoretical model that predicts that a hospital will not respond to changes in the efficiency of its rivals but may change its quality or efficiency in response to changes in the quality of rivals, though the direction of the response is ambiguous. We use data on eight quality measures (including mortality, emergency readmissions, patient reported outcome, and patient satisfaction) and six efficiency measures (including bed occupancy, cancelled operations, and costs) for public hospitals between 2010/11 and 2013/14 to estimate both spatial cross-sectional and spatial fixed-and random-effects panel data models. We find that although quality and efficiency measures are unconditionally spatially correlated, the spatial regression models suggest that a hospital's quality or efficiency does not respond to its rivals' quality or efficiency, except for a hospital's overall mortality that is positively associated with that of its rivals. The results are robust to allowing for spatially correlated covariates and errors and to instrumenting rivals' quality and efficiency. KEYWORDS competition, efficiency, hospitals, quality, spatial econometrics
| INTRODUCTION
Quality and efficiency are fundamental goals for policymakers in the hospital sector. In the presence of fixed prices, policymakers have argued that competition may induce hospitals to compete on quality to attract patients and to enhance their efficiency (Gaynor, 2007) . Investigations of the effect of competition on quality and efficiency in the United States, the U.K., and other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries have produced mixed results (Section 1.1).
In this study, rather than examining the relationship between measures of competition and hospital quality and efficiency, we use an alternative approach by examining hospitals' strategic interactions. For example, in a competitive environment, we may expect a hospital to respond to an increase in quality by a rival hospital by also increasing quality: in industrial economics terms, qualities are strategic complements. We present a simple theory model (Section 2) that shows that this intuition can be correct if treatment costs are increasing in quality. The reduction in demand that follows from an increase in rival's quality reduces total treatment cost of providing quality and at the margin incentivises the hospital to increase quality. There is however an offsetting effect: the reduction in demand also reduces incentives to contain cost that reduces the profit margin on additional patients. We therefore investigate empirically whether quality and efficiency are strategic complements or strategic substitutes so that higher rivals' quality (efficiency) induces a hospital to increase or reduce its quality (efficiency).
We consider both clinical and non-clinical dimensions of quality. We measure clinical quality through risk-adjusted overall mortality and readmission rate, and mortality rates for high-volume conditions such as hip fracture and stroke. Because the vast majority of patients do not die or have an emergency readmission, we also measure health gains for a common elective procedure (hip replacement) using patient-reported outcome measures (PROMs). We capture nonclinical dimensions of patients' experience using patient satisfaction with their overall hospital experience, hospital cleanliness, and the extent to which clinicians involved the patients in the treatment decision. We measure hospital efficiency through indicators for bed occupancy, cancelled elective operations, and cost indices for overall hospital activity, elective and non-elective activity, and for hip replacement. All these measures are in the public domain so that hospital managers and senior physicians are in principle able to compare themselves with their rivals.
The global Moran's I test suggests that most of the quality and efficiency indicators are unconditionally spatially correlated. We estimate spatial cross-sectional models by quasi-maximum likelihood (ML) controlling for observable determinants of quality and efficiency. To control for unobserved time-invariant determinants of quality and efficiency, we also estimate spatial panel models with hospital fixed or random effects. These models suggest that a hospital's quality or efficiency does not respond to its rivals' quality or efficiency, except for a hospital's overall mortality that is positively associated with that of its rivals. The results are robust to allowing for spatially correlated covariates and errors and to instrumenting rivals' quality and efficiency.
Sections 1.1 and 1.2 review the literature and the institutional background. Section 2 provides a simple theoretical model. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 discusses the results, and Section 6 concludes.
| Related literature
Our study contributes to the literature on hospital competition and, more broadly, to spatial econometrics applications in health economics. Early studies focus on the relationship between hospital competition and efficiency in the United States. They show that non-price competition combined with a cost-based reimbursement system may lead to overprovision of hospital services (e.g., Joskow, 1980; Robinson & Luft, 1985) . Later studies find a beneficial effect of price competition on costs (e.g., Bamezai, Zwanziger, Melnick, & Mann, 1999; Zwanziger & Melnick, 1988) . Studies on the impact of hospital competition on clinical quality, measured usually by mortality, have mixed results. Some find that competition improves quality (Kessler & Geppert, 2005; Kessler & McClellan, 2000) , others that competition reduces quality (Gowrisankaran & Town, 2003) or has no effect (Mukamel, Zwanziger, & Tomaszewski, 2001 ).
U.K. studies also have mixed results. Although some find that competition increases efficiency (Cooper, Gibbons, Jones, & Mcguire, 2012; Gaynor, Moreno-Serra, & Propper, 2013) , others report no association (Söderlund, Csaba, Gray, Milne, & Raftery, 1997) . Some studies find negative effects of competition on quality when prices are not fixed and negotiated with the purchaser (Propper, Burgess, & Gossage, 2008; Propper, Burgess, & Green, 2004) ; some later studies find positive effects where prices were fixed within a diagnosis-related group DRG-type system (Bloom, Propper, Seiler, & Van Reenen, 2015; Cooper, Gibbons, Jones, & Mcguire, 2011; Gaynor et al., 2013) , and some find mixed effects based on the quality indicator (Gravelle, Moscelli, Santos, & Siciliani, 2014) .
A smaller number of studies take a different approach: rather than examining the quasi-reduced form relationship between market structure and quality or price, they use spatial econometric methods to investigate strategic interactions amongst hospitals by examining whether a hospital's quality or price depends on the quality or price of its rivals. Mobley (2003) and Mobley, Frech, and Anselin (2009) examine strategic complementarity in prices within the U.S. context where hospital prices are not fixed. Similarly, Choné, Coudin, and Pla (2014) study strategic complementarity of general practitioners' (GPs) prices in France using an instrumental variable (IV) approach. Gravelle, Santos, and Siciliani (2014) use a cross section of English data and find that four out of 16 clinical and patient-reported hospital quality measures are strategic complements.
We contribute to this literature in a number of ways. First, we complement the theory model in Brekke, Siciliani, and Straume (2012) , which shows that competition can influence efficiency through its effect on quality, and the finding in Cooper et al. (2012) , which suggest that market structure affects efficiency, by examining strategic interactions amongst hospitals with respect to efficiency. Second, we employ panel data to control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. Third, previous studies on strategic interactions amongst hospitals have been cross-sectional and so may
| Institutional background
The English National Health Service (NHS) provides healthcare that is universal, tax financed, and free at the point of use. The Department of Health distributes capitated funding to around 150 local health authorities that use it to pay for secondary healthcare provided to NHS patients by public and private hospitals. Public hospitals are run by NHS Trusts or NHS Foundation Trusts, the latter having greater financial autonomy. Some NHS hospital trusts are teaching trusts providing research and teaching, and some are specialist trusts focusing on a limited range of conditions or client groups.
Hospitals are mainly funded through a prospective payment system, the National Tariff Payment System. This is based on healthcare resource groups (HRGs), a patient classification system similar to the American DRG. The HRGs categorise patients into homogeneous groups depending on diagnoses, procedures, and some patient characteristics. A fixed tariff is calculated for each HRG as its national cost averaged across providers but with adjustments for individual hospitals to reflect exogenous variations in input prices and the higher costs of specialised care (Department of Health, 2013) .
Hospital competition has been encouraged by relaxing restrictions on patients' choice of hospital for elective care. Since 2008, patients have been allowed to choose any qualified provider (Department of Health, 2009) . Choice is facilitated through the website "NHS Choices," which provides information on hospital performance (e.g., mortality and waiting times).
| THEORETICAL MODEL
We sketch a simple two-provider model of quality competition and cost-reducing effort. Hospital i has demand function D i (q i , q j ) that is increasing in own quality q i and decreasing in the quality of hospital j. The objective function of hospital i is as follows:
where p is the fixed price per treatment that the hospital receives from a third-party payer. c i (q i , e i ) are variable treatment costs, which are increasing in quality and decreasing in cost-containment effort or efficiency e i . G i (q i , e i ) are monetary and non-monetary fixed costs that are increasing in both quality and cost-containment (managerial) effort.
We assume that quality and cost-containment effort are substitutes, that is, G iq i e i q i ; e i ð Þ>0, because both are types of managerial effort. To keep computations simple, we assume that quality and efficiency are instead independent in variable costs, that is, c iq i e i q i ; e i ð Þ¼0. θ i is a vector of shift parameters (such as local input prices, population demographics, and morbidity).
Hospital i chooses quality and efficiency to satisfy:
where D iq i >0, c iq i >0, and G iq i >0 and denote partial derivatives with respect to quality. With strictly concave utility functions, these optimality conditions are also sufficient. Note that the price must exceed the marginal cost of treating additional patients if the hospital is to be induced to provide positive quality. The optimal quality is determined such that the marginal profit from higher additional demand is equal to the marginal cost of quality. The optimal level of efficiency (cost-containment effort) is such that the marginal benefit from lower costs and higher profits are equal to the marginal disutility from efficiency. The first-order conditions (2) and (3) define the reaction functions for hospital i's quality and efficiency as functions of the choice of quality by hospital j:
Because neither of the first-order conditions depends on the efficiency of hospital j, it is apparent that quality and efficiency of hospital i are strategically independent of the efficiency of hospital j.
Totally differentiating the first-order conditions, we obtain:
where Δ ¼ U iq i q i U ie i e i −U iq i e i 2 >0 by the concavity of the objective function. The term in square brackets in (6) is the direct effect of the rival's quality on the marginal profit from higher quality. It is not obvious whether an increase in rival's quality reduces or increases the marginal gain in patient numbers from higher quality. Suppose for simplicity that D iq i q j is 0. The second part of the square-bracketed term is the reduction in the variable cost because the increase in rival's quality reduces demand and so the marginal cost of output of hospital i, which then responds by increasing quality. However, the second term in the curly bracket shows that the lower demand also reduces incentives to contain costs (indirect effect) and so variable cost may increase, making increases in quality to attract additional patients less profitable.
| METHODS
We investigate whether hospitals' quality or efficiency responds to the quality or efficiency of their rivals estimating cross-sectional linear versions of the reaction functions by ML:
where y i is the quality or efficiency of hospital i (i = 1, …, I); y j is the quality or efficiency of hospital i's rival j (j ≠ i); w ij are spatial weights; X i is a vector of covariates including demand shifters (e.g., population density and proportion of elderly individuals), supply shifters (e.g., number of managers and proportion of consultants), hospital type (e.g., foundation trusts and teaching hospitals), and a constant; and ε i is the error term. In matrix form, we estimate:
where W is the spatial weight matrix composed of the elements w ij . The spatial weights are generated from the inverse distance function:
where d ij is the straight line distance between hospital i and j. We assume, as in recent literature, that 30 km is the radius within which hospitals compete (Bloom et al., 2015; Gaynor, Laudicella, & Propper, 2012) . Hospitals that are further away within a 30-km radius have a lower weight, and hospitals that are further than 30 km have a 0 weight. The weight matrix W is row standardised, that is, the elements of each row sum to 1. WY is therefore a weighted average of the rivals' quality or efficiency. The key coefficient is ρ. If ρ > 0, then quality (efficiency) increases in response to an increase in rivals' quality (efficiency). But there are two other potential reasons for spatial correlation in outcomes. First, a hospital's quality may vary with characteristics of rival hospitals, such as proportion of foundation trusts amongst rivals. Second, unobserved characteristics common across rival hospitals may affect quality in a given area. For instance, rival hospitals with appealing neighbourhoods are more likely to attract and employ skilled doctors and managers and provide similar quality. If we fail to account for these factors, spatial correlation will be spurious.
There is an analogy between our spatial approach and the peer-effects literature where the identification issue is known as the "reflection problem" (Manski, 1993) . Strategic interactions amongst hospitals, as captured by the rivals' quality or efficiency (WY), are the endogenous effects of the peer-effects literature. Observed characteristics of rival hospitals (WX) are the contextual effects and unobserved hospital characteristics similar across rivals are correlated effects contained in the error term ε.
To control for time-invariant unobserved factors, we estimate spatial panel models using the fixed-or random-effects ML estimator 1 :
where γ t is a year indicator. The hospital effect α i captures unobserved time-invariant hospital heterogeneity and will therefore potentially reduce time-invariant bias from contextual and correlated effects. Estimates, however, might still be biased in the presence of unobserved time-varying factors affecting the patient case mix. For instance, patient comorbidities and severity not captured by the risk adjustment may lead to higher hospital mortality rates. Risk-adjustment methodologies generally use routine patient data that reflect the information collected through DRG-type patient classification systems. Although such systems provide a large number of patient categories, there is recognition that they can only imperfectly capture patient complexity (e.g., Gutacker et al., 2013; Mason, Ward, & Street, 2011) . Because patient comorbidities and severity vary over time, we cannot rule them out as a potential source of endogeneity. We test the robustness of our results in a number of ways. First, we estimate the spatial Durbin model (SDM) adding all the spatially lagged covariates (WX) to the cross-sectional and panel models. This will reduce potential bias due to contextual effects. Second, we allow for correlated effects that lead to spatially correlated errors by estimating spatial autocorrelation (SAC) models with spatially lagged errors: ε it = λ∑ j w ij ε jt + ξ it . Third, following the theory in Section 2, we test whether a hospital's quality (efficiency) responds to rivals' efficiency (quality) by adding a spatially lagged efficiency (quality) measure to the main regressions. We also examine whether results are sensitive to extending the radius within which hospitals compete to 60 or 90 km.
Finally, in cross-sectional models, to further address potential bias from contextual and correlated effects, we use two-stage least squares instrumenting WY t with its 2-or 3-year lagged value (WY t-2 or WY t-3 ). An instrument is valid (Stock & Watson, 2003, p. 423) if it is exogenous (not a regressor in the second-stage regression and uncorrelated with unobserved factors captured by the error term) and relevant (correlated with the instrumented endogenous variable). We argue that, although current outcomes are potentially influenced by rival's current outcomes (or possibly last-period outcomes), adjustment is sufficiently rapid that current outcomes are not affected by what rivals were doing 2 or 3 years previously. Some studies on the English NHS (Gaynor, Propper, & Seiler, 2012; Gutacker, Siciliani, Moscelli, & Gravelle, 2016; Sivey, 2012) show that patients choose hospitals with higher quality and lower waiting times. For example, Gutacker, Siciliani, Moscelli, and Gravelle (2016) find that the demand of a hospital decreases by 0.63% if a rival located within 10 km increases its PROMs quality by 1%. Hospitals are therefore unlikely to delay their reaction to changes in rivals' performance by 2 or 3 years in order to avoid reductions in the volume of patients treated and, hence, revenue. On the other hand, WY t-2 (or WY t-3 ) is likely to be relevant because hospital quality is unlikely to change rapidly over time so that WY t-2 (or WY t-3 ) will be a good predictor of WY t . We can also test for relevance in the first-stage model. 
| DATA

| Quality indicators
The risk-adjusted Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator (SHMI) is the ratio of the actual number of deaths from all causes in hospital or within 30 days of discharge to the number of deaths expected given the characteristics of patients. The expected deaths are estimated through a logistic regression controlling for differences in patient case mix. We also use risk-adjusted mortality rates for two emergency conditions (hip fracture and stroke) and risk-adjusted emergency readmissions for all conditions. These three indicators are calculated through an indirect standardisation methodology that multiplies the ratio between observed and expected events (deaths or readmissions) by the national rate of patients. The expected events are in this case the product between the number of patients for a provider and the national rate of patients for each risk-adjustment category (e.g., gender-age combination) summed over all categories. We use risk-adjusted average health change for elective hip replacement patients derived from PROMs data. On the basis of the EuroQol five dimensions or EQ-5D questionnaire (Brooks, 1996; Brooks, Kind, & Rabin, 2005) , the change in a patient's health is calculated as difference between the self-assessed health status of elective patients before and 6 months after their surgery. Clinical quality indicators and PROMs are available from the Health and Social Care Information Centre.
and they are risk-adjusted using patients' gender, age, ethnic group, and admission method (elective or emergency). They are available from the annual NHS Inpatient Surveys conducted for the Care Quality Commission.
| Efficiency indicators
The bed occupancy rate is the ratio of occupied to available hospital beds (e.g., Zuckerman, Hadley, & Iezzoni, 1994) . We measure the rate of cancelled elective operations as the ratio of the number of cancelled elective operations for nonclinical reasons to the number of elective admissions (Rumbold, Smith, Hurst, Charlesworth, & Clarke, 2015) . The reference cost index (RCI) compares a hospital's total costs with the national average total costs for the same HRGs. An RCI greater than 100 indicates higher than average costs. We also use the RCI for elective and non-elective activity and for hip replacement.
| Control variables
Our control variables include demand and supply shifters. Demand shifters comprise demographic variables such as population density and proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, which we calculate using annual mid-year population estimates; socio-economic measures: proportion of individuals employed or looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, and proportion of owner occupier households; and a measure of population health: proportion of individuals in good or very good health. Socio-economic and health measures are computed using 2011 Census data for all small areas within a 15-km radius.
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Supply shifters include the number of managers, junior doctors in training as a proportion of total clinical staff, consultants as a proportion of total clinical staff, and the number of beds. whereas NHS statistics provide the number of beds. 9 Finally, we control for type of hospital: foundation trust, teaching hospital, and specialist hospital. Table 1 has descriptive statistics. The number of hospital trusts varies between 106 (for hip fracture mortality rate) and 142 (for emergency readmission rate) across indicators. The sample size for each indicator is determined by the number of hospitals with at least one rival and is constant over time because we use a balanced panel. Hospitals with no providers within a radius of 30 km (i.e., monopolists) are dropped because, by construction, they do not compete. In the case of the sample for overall patient satisfaction, 13% of hospitals are monopolists, 23% are exposed to low competition with one or two rivals, 38% are located in areas with three to nine rivals, and 26% have more than nine rivals (up to a maximum of 25 rivals). The SHMI and the RCIs are on average 100 by construction. On average, patients undergoing hip replacement have an average health gain of 0.413 health-related quality of life, and 79% of all patients report high overall satisfaction.
| Descriptive statistics
The summary statistics for the explanatories are for the overall patient satisfaction hospital sample. Amongst the demand shifters, for example, 15.7% of individuals are over 65 years old. Eighty-three hospitals (62.9%) are foundation trusts, 24 (18.4%) are teaching, and 14 (10.6%) are specialist.
Because hospital catchment areas overlap by construction for hospitals with at least one rival, a hospital's demand shifters are always strongly (above 80%) correlated with its rivals'. In contrast, supply shifters have more variations across rivals (Tables A1 and A2) . 6 These areas (Lower Layer Super Output Areas) have on average 1,500 inhabitants and a minimum of 1,000. 7 The total clinical staff is the total number of doctors, nurses, and allied professionals (e.g., therapists, healthcare scientists, and technicians). 8 Siciliani and Martin (2007) show that more consultants are associated with lower waiting times for elective care.
9 Data on hospital staff are available from 2010/11 onwards. The number of managers, the proportion of junior doctors in training, and the proportion of consultants are therefore omitted in the regressions for the emergency readmission rate to allow comparability between cross-sectional and panel models. Table 2 has the results of the global Moran's I test for overall spatial correlation of the quality and efficiency indicators.
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Spatial correlation is significant (at 5% level) and positive for two clinical indicators (SHMI and emergency readmissions) and two patient-reported indicators (patient satisfaction on overall experience and hospital cleanliness). Its magnitude varies between moderate (0.150 for overall patient satisfaction in 2012/13) and high (0.528 for SHMI in 2012/13). All four cost indicators have a significant and positive spatial correlation ranging between 0.150 (for RCI for hip replacement in 2011/12) and 0.483 (for RCI in 2013/14). 11 10 The global Moran's I test calculates the overall degree of spatial association between observations (Anselin, 2013) . It differs from the local Moran's I test, which provides a measure of spatial clustering for each observation (Anselin, 1995) . 11 The local Moran's I test on quality and efficiency indicators in 2010/11 (available upon request) has some evidence of spatial correlations for London hospitals. Other hospitals not located in London, however, also exhibit a positive and significant local spatial correlation. The majority of hospitals show an insignificant local spatial correlation. Note. Descriptive statistics refer to the sample of providers with at least one rival. Descriptive statistics on control variables are calculated on the overall patient satisfaction's sample. Monop = number of monopolists; Obs = total number of observations; Trusts = number of non-monopolist hospital trusts. Table 3 reports the estimated spatial lag coefficient (b ρ) from the ML models for each quality and efficiency indicator after controlling for demand shifters, supply shifters, and type of hospital (full results with coefficients on the covariates are in Tables A3 and A4 ). In the cross-sectional models, SHMI has positive and statistically significant spatial lag for two years. Ten percent lower SHMI (higher quality) in rival hospitals increases the hospital's SHMI by 2.9% in 2010/11 and 2% in 2011/12. For other quality and efficiency indicators, we obtain a statistically insignificant or weakly significant (at 10% level) estimated spatial lag with a few exceptions (stroke mortality rate in 2013/14 and non-elective RCI in 2010/11). 12 Overall, there is weak statistical evidence of spatial correlation in cross-sectional models.
| Regression results
Unlike supply shifters and hospital-type dummies, demand shifters play a major role in generating cross-sectional spatial correlation. Rival hospitals are indeed close neighbours sharing similar population characteristics. Table 3 also has estimates of the spatial lag coefficient after controlling for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity with fixed-and random-effects panel data models. There is a positive statistically significant spatial lag for two of the quality measures (0.172 for SHMI and 0.110 for overall patient satisfaction), and none of the efficiency models have statistically significant spatial lags. 13 In sum, the cross-sectional and panel ML estimates do not suggest that hospital quality or efficiency generally depends on rivals' quality or efficiency.
| Robustness and sensitivity analysis
We also estimate the effect of the spatial lag WY in SDM models with spatially lagged covariates and SAC models that allow for spatial correlation in the error term. The SDM results in Table 4 are broadly similar to those in Table 3 . Once we allow for possible contextual effects with spatially lagged covariates, the only hospital outcome variable that is 12 We also test the robustness of our results for bed occupancy rate and the RCI to risk adjustment by controlling for proportion of male patients, patient age, and proportion of emergency admissions in Equations 7 and 10. The results (available upon request) remain similar to those reported in correlated with rival outcomes is SHMI. When we instead allow possible correlated effects with the SAC specification (Table 5) , we again find that SHMI is the only quality indicator spatially correlated with rivals. However, two of the six efficiency measures (cancelled elective procedures and elective RCI) are negatively correlated with those of rivals. Likelihood ratio tests (reported in Table A5 ) suggest that adding the spatial lags of covariates (the SDM specification) only improves model fit for overall patient satisfaction and the rate of cancelled elective operations. The SAC model only improves the fit in the case of cancelled elective operations. Thus, overall, allowing for contextual or correlated effects with SDM or SAC models does not change the results from the simpler specification. 14 We also test whether a hospital's quality (efficiency) responds to rivals' efficiency (quality) by adding spatial lags of efficiency (quality) to the baseline model.
15 Results in Table 6 are similar to those in Table 3 in respect of the effect of 14 We also find that expanding the catchment areas to 60 or 90 km from 30 km does not change the results of the baseline models reported in Table 3 .
Results are available on request. 15 We use rivals' bed occupancy rate and reference cost index as measures of rivals' efficiency, and rivals' SHMI and overall patient satisfaction as measures of rivals' quality. The RE estimator passes the Hausman test at 5% level, and it is therefore consistent and efficient. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
rivals' quality (efficiency) on hospital quality (efficiency). In addition, and in line with our theoretical predictions, we do not generally observe an effect of rivals' efficiency on a hospital's quality (Table A6 ). Our theory model does however imply that rivals' quality could affect hospital efficiency, and we find some weak evidence for this (Table A7 ). For instance, higher rivals' quality, as measured by the SHMI, is significantly associated with better efficiency, as measured by the non-elective RCI, in 2010/11, 2011/12, and 2012/13. However, this association is only weakly significant (at 10% level) in 2013/14 and disappears in the panel model. Table 7 has the results from two-stage least squares cross-sectional models instrumenting the spatial lags of quality or efficiency with their temporal spatial lags WY t-2 or WY t-3 . The instruments appear relevant in that they have first stage F statistics greater than 10 (Staiger & Stock, 1997) . The IV estimates also suggest little evidence of strategic interactions across hospitals in quality or efficiency: The spatial lag is significant at 5% level for only the SHMI in 2012-13 and the emergency readmissions in 2013-14 (Tables A8 and A9) . The RE estimator passes the Hausman test at 5% level, and it is therefore consistent and efficient. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
| IV results
The results in our study are compatible with those reported in Gravelle, Santos, and Siciliani (2014) , who analyse 16 quality indicators for English hospitals in 2009/10 through a spatial lag model estimated by ML. The two studies have five indicators in common: three mortality indicators (overall mortality, hip fracture, and stroke mortality) and two patient satisfaction indicators (satisfaction with hospital cleanliness and decision involvement).
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16 Gravelle, Santos, and Siciliani (2014) explore the spatial dependence for other indicators not included in this study. Amongst these, they find a positive and significant spatial correlation for hip replacement readmissions and patient satisfaction on trust in the doctors. No (or weak) spatial dependence is instead observed for mortality from high-and low-risk conditions, deaths after surgery, hip replacement and stroke readmissions, hip and knee revisions, operations within 2 days from hip fracture, and redo rates for prostate resection. Note. ML estimation. Each cross-sectional regression controls for population density, proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, proportion of individuals employed or looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner occupier households, proportion of individuals in good or very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in training, proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, and specialist hospital. The panel model also includes year dummies. In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence of specialist hospitals in these samples. Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011/12. Cross-sectional estimates in year 2012/13 and 2013/14 are therefore omitted. Panel estimates are obtained using data from 2008/09 to 2011/12. In addition, data on hospital staff are available from 2010/11 onwards. Hence, all regressions for the emergency readmission rate do not include the number of managers, the proportion of junior doctors in training, and the proportion of consultants. The p value is omitted. FE = fixed effect; ML = maximum likelihood; SAC = spatial autocorrelation. SHMI = Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1. (2014) in 2009/10 with ours in 2010/11 and 2011/12 (the two closest years), the spatial lag is significant for overall mortality, and it is insignificant for hip fracture mortality in both studies. The stroke mortality spatial lag is weakly significant in Gravelle, Santos, and Siciliani (2014) and insignificant in our study. The results for the patient satisfaction indicators differ. They are significant or weakly significant in Gravelle, Santos, and Siciliani (2014) but insignificant in our model. The differences may be due to the different sample years and, in the case of satisfaction with decision involvement, to the inclusion of additional demand shifters. The RE estimator passes the Hausman test at 5% level, and it is therefore consistent and efficient. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1. . Each regression controls for population density, proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, proportion of individuals employed or looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner occupier households, proportion of individuals in good/very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in training, proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, and specialist hospital. In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence of specialist hospitals in these samples. Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011/12. The estimate refers to the latest available years (2010/11 or 2011/12) and not to 2012/13 or 2013/14. For stroke mortality and average health change after hip replacement, estimates are omitted because of the absence of a relevant instrument. The p values in parentheses. IV = instrumental variable; SHMI = Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1. Note. GSS: Gravelle, Santos, Siciliani; Both Gravelle, Santos, and Siciliani (2014) and our study's estimates are obtained by ML. Although Gravelle, Santos, and Siciliani (2014) use an inverse distance weight matrix with a 30-min travel distance threshold, we use a 30-km straight line distance threshold. Specification (1) controls for number of rivals, teaching trusts, foundation trusts, specialist hospitals, number of patients, market forces factor, population density, and London trusts. Specification (2) controls for all covariates in (1) and for proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, proportion of individuals employed and looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner occupier households, proportion of individuals with a degree, and proportion of individuals in good and very good health. The specialist dummy is omitted if the quality indicator's sample does not include specialist hospitals, that is, for all indicators included in Gravelle, Santos, and Siciliani (2014) and for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality rate. The p values in parentheses. ML = maximum likelihood; SHMI = Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator.
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
| CONCLUSIONS
We investigated whether a hospital's quality or efficiency responds to an increase in quality or efficiency of its rivals. We test for unconditional spatial correlation using the global Moran's I test and find strong evidence of positive spatial correlation for four of the eight quality and four of the six efficiency indicators. But when we estimate ML spatial cross-sectional models that include covariates potentially affecting hospital demand and costs, we no longer observe statistically significant spatial dependence for most indicators. Only for overall hospital mortality there is significant correlation with rivals' quality. Similarly, we observe little evidence of spatial dependence, except for overall mortality, after controlling for unobserved time-invariant hospital heterogeneity in ML spatial panel models. Finally, after instrumenting the spatial lags of quality and efficiency by their temporal lags, we again find little evidence of spatial dependence. Hospital quality (efficiency), therefore, does not appear to respond to the quality (efficiency) of neighbouring hospitals.
In conclusion, our empirical analysis suggests the absence of hospital spillovers in quality and efficiency. The results are in line with our theoretical model, which shows that efficiencies are strategic independent. The model also implies that whether qualities are strategic complements or substitutes is in principle indeterminate. A hospital whose rivals have higher quality will, ceteris paribus, have lower demand, and this may both reduce the marginal cost of providing quality but also weaken incentives to contain costs therefore reducing the price markup and the incentive to provide quality. These two effects may cancel out leaving quality unaffected by rivals' quality.
The lack of hospital strategic interaction on quality is not incompatible with the recent empirical literature (reviewed in Section 1.1) that shows that areas with less concentrated hospital market structure (more competition) increases quality in England (Bloom et al., 2015; Cooper et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2013) . For example, our model suggests that if the marginal cost of treatment is constant, then qualities are strategic independent. But in this scenario, it is still the case that a market structure with a larger number of rivals increases the demand responsiveness and therefore the marginal revenue from an increase in quality (so that equilibrium quality increases in the number of providers).
These findings have policy implications. They suggest that policy interventions incentivising quality or efficiency at local level will not generate positive (or negative) spillovers to other hospitals. A local policy intervention, for example, a care commissioning group that introduces a pay for performance scheme in a hospital will change quality in that hospital but will not increase the quality in other nearby hospitals. Similarly, the adoption of a new technology that increases quality in one hospital will not necessarily spread out to other hospitals. In turn, this implies that there may be scope for policymakers to develop policies that encourage cooperation across hospitals. For example, in France, a new policy tool was introduced in 2016 (Groupement Hospitalier de Territoire) to foster cooperation of public hospitals under which each hospital has to join a group associated with a teaching hospital and can share activity, equipment, medical teams, and a joint information system (Choné, 2017; Siciliani, Chalkley, & Gravelle, 2017) .
The results have also implications for antitrust policies. Brekke, Siciliani, and Straume (2017) for example suggest that if two hospitals merge, they will reduce quality and costs, and non-merging rival hospitals might also reduce quality if quality is a strategic complements. Our study suggests that hospital mergers will not induce other non-merging hospitals also to reduce quality or costs. Policy makers can therefore concentrate on evaluating just the immediate effects of a potential merger on the merging hospitals. Zwanziger, J., & Melnick, G. A. (1988) . The effects of hospital competition and the Medicare PPS program on hospital cost behavior in California. Journal of Health Economics, 7, 301-320.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Additional Supporting Information may be found online in the supporting information tab for this article. 
Quality indicators
The SHMI is a ratio of the observed number of deaths to the expected number of deaths for a trust (provider). The observed number of deaths is the total number of finished provider spells for the trust that resulted in a death either in-hospital or within 30 days (inclusive) of discharge from the trust. The expected deaths are estimated through a logistic regression controlling for age, gender, admission method, year index, Charlson comorbidity index, and diagnosis grouping. A 3-year dataset is used to create the risk-adjusted models. The hip fracture mortality rate captures deaths within 30 days (from 0 to 29 days inclusive) of an emergency admission to hospital with a primary diagnosis of fractured proximal femur (ICD-10 codes S720, S721, and S722). It is indirectly standardised by age and sex. The stroke mortality rate captures deaths within 30 days (from 0 to 29 days inclusive) of an emergency admission to hospital with a primary diagnosis of stroke (all ICD-10 codes from I61 to I64). It is indirectly standardised by age and sex. The emergency readmission rate captures the percentage of emergency admission to any hospital in England occurring within 28 days of the last discharge from hospital after admission. The rate is calculated considering all patients aged between 16 and 74. It is indirectly standardised by age, sex, method of admission of discharge spell, diagnosis within medical specialties, and procedure within surgical specialties. Source: Health and Social Care Information Centre, NHS Digital Indicator Portal Link: https://indicators.hscic.gov.uk/webview/ The average health change after hip replacement is extracted from PROMs data. PROMs comprise a pair of questionnaires completed by the patient, one before and one after surgery (at least 6 months after for hip replacements). All patients, irrespective of their condition, are asked to complete a common set of questions about their health status. This includes sections about the patient's circumstances, preexisting conditions, and the EQ-5D health questionnaire consisting of a five-dimensional descriptive system and a visual analogue scale (EQ-VAS). Post-operative questionnaires also contain additional questions about the surgery, such as how the patient perceives the results of the operation and whether there were any post-operative complications, such as bleeding or wound problems. Patients undergoing hip replacement surgery are also asked to complete a condition-specific section. The collected data are risk-adjusted for patient characteristics (e.g., gender, age, and ethnics), initial health status, self-assessed health status, economic deprivation, comorbidity, procedure, and postoperative length of stay. Source: Health and Social Care Information Centre Link: http://content.digital.nhs.uk/proms Patient satisfaction indicators are derived from the NHS Inpatient Surveys for the Care Quality Commission that is administered to a random sample of patients in all acute trusts. The variables relate to three questions to patients: (a) from 0 to 100, "Overall, how would you rate the care you received?" (overall patient satisfaction); (b) from 0 to 100, "In your opinion, how clean was the hospital room or ward that you were in?" (satisfaction on hospital cleanliness); and (c) from 0 to 100, "Were you involved as much as you wanted to be in decisions about your care and treatment?" (satisfaction on decision involvement). The data have been standardised to adjust for these differences in patient mix using the respondent's age, gender, ethnic group, and method of admission (emergency or elective). Source: NHS patient surveys Links: http://www.nhssurveys.org/surveys, https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/patients-experience-using-hospital-services 
Efficiency indicators
The bed occupancy rate is the ratio of the overnight occupied beds to the overnight available beds. For wards open overnight, an occupied bed day is defined as one that is occupied at midnight on the day in question. The number of occupied beds excludes any bed days of occupation by well babies. The number of available beds only includes beds in units managed by the provider, not beds commissioned from other providers. It excludes any beds designated solely for the use of well babies. Such data are available quarterly. The rate of cancelled elective operations is the ratio of the number of last-minute cancellations by the hospital for non-clinical reasons to the number of elective patients. Last minute means on the day the patient was due to arrive, after the patient has arrived in hospital, or on the day of the operation or surgery. Elective cancelled operations are provided in each quarter. The number of elective patients is calculated as the sum of planned and waiting list admissions, where the admission is a finished admission episode, that is, the first period of inpatient care under one consultant within one healthcare provider. The number of elective patients is published annually. Source: NHS statistics Link: https://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/ The reference cost index shows the actual cost of an organisation's case mix compared with the same case mix delivered at national average cost. Each organisation's reference cost index is calculated by dividing its total costs (unit costs × activity) by the expected costs (national average mean unit cost × activity). The reference cost index is computed separately also for elective and non-elective activity. Elective activity refers to patients whose admission to hospital is planned, including day-case patients. Non-elective activity refers to patients whose admission is not planned, including emergency admissions and admissions for maternity, births, and non-emergency patient transfers, and requires staying in hospital for more than 1 day. The reference cost index for hip replacement is calculated selecting the HRG codes: HB11A, HB11B, HB11C, HB12A, HB12B, and HB12C. Source: Reference costs data Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/nhs-reference-costs Note. HRG = healthcare resource group; NHS = National Health Service. Note.
Stock-Yogo 10% maximal IV size critical value = 16.38; Stock-Yogo 15% maximal IV size critical value = 8.96; Stock-Yogo 20% maximal IV size critical value = 6.66; Stock-Yogo 25% maximal IV size critical value = 5.53. Each regression controls for population density, proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, proportion of individuals employed and looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner occupier households, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of individuals in good and very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in training, proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. Control variables are included in the first stage of the 2SLS estimator. In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence of specialist hospitals in these samples. Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011/12. The estimate refers to the most recent available years (2010/11 and 2011/12) . For stroke mortality and average health change after hip replacement, estimates are omitted because of the absence of relevant instruments. The p values in parentheses. 2SLS = two-stage least squares; IV = instrumental variable; SHMI = Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator.
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1. Note.
Stock-Yogo 10% maximal IV size critical value = 16.38; Stock-Yogo 15% maximal IV size critical value = 8.96; Stock-Yogo 20% maximal IV size critical value = 6.66; Stock-Yogo 25% maximal IV size critical value = 5.53. Each regression controls for population density, proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, proportion of individuals employed and looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner occupier households, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of individuals in good and very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in training, proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, and specialist hospital. Control variables are included in the first stage of the 2SLS estimator. The p values in parentheses. 2SLS = two-stage least squares; IV = instrumental variable; RCI = reference cost index. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
